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AbstrAct
This study deals with the relationship between underreported earnings, 
savings and old-age pension. The presented model is taken from the 
paper “Underreported Earnings and Old-Age Pension System: An 
Elementary System” of Hungarian Academy of Science and is applied 
to the Albanian data. Three pension systems have been compared: 1- 
the proportional, 2- the proportional plus basic pension and, 3- the 
proportional with means testing. The workers are grouped such as, a- 
well-paid who report their full earnings (so-called the evaders), b- well-
paid who report only the minimum earnings and c- the poorly paid. It 
is assumed that the evaders have a hidden part of earnings for their old-
age. The main result of the study is the following: if the evaders can be 
recognized and excluded, then the best system is the means-tested one.
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Introduction
As far as global economy is considered, the pension system is found to be one of the 
most discussed systems as the main pillar of the life-long expenditure distribution. 
Ex-communist countries, such as Albania, are often found face to face with the im-
mediate need of reforms in such systems. Developing countries have difficulties in 
choosing the appropriate pension system because of a large gamma of variable that 
can be used in the model, different characteristics countries and the lack of a fix “re-
ceipt”. Meanwhile, the experience of the developed countries have to be considered 
important.   
The aim of this paper is to develop a model of pension system by using the Albanian 
official Statistical Data and considering general knowledge about this market. 
There exist two pure forms of mandatory pension systems: the proportional, which 
reflects the life-long contributions, and the basic benefit, which relies in fixed quote 
(defined benefit). Proportional pension system transforms the workers’ savings into 
pensions proportionally to their earnings, while the flat benefit, is paid indepen-
dently to the earnings. At the same time there can exist a lot of combinations be-
tween these two extrem systems (Disney, 2004). For example, the British system 
provides a flat benefit for each individual, whereas additional pensions are taken 
into consideration in the mean-testing. Another example can be the case of Hun-
garian pension system, a combination of proportional and basic system (Auguszti-
novics and Martos, 1996)
This study is based on the study made by the Institute of Economics, Hungarian 
Academy of Science (2008). The Hungarian system is a combination of both sys-
tems, the proportional and the basic one. The third system we deal with is that of 
means-tested, which take into consideration additional pensions.
There exist a debate to remove the fixed component, which favorize the poorly-
paid workes with short contrats. The debates pushed toward proposals such as the 
immediate need of a new system combining the fixed component and the propor-
tional one. This study presents the means-tested system which has lower costs and 
increases the low pensions only.  
The level of the informal economy in the region countries and especially in Albania, 
is widely studied but often without coming to a consolidate conclusion. However, 
this phenomenon prompted the Albanian government in 2006 and 2007 to un-
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dertake a more comprehensive survey conducted in the labor market. The aim was 
to minimize the underreporting of private sector wages. The Council of Ministers, 
in 4th of May, 2007 determined the monthly reference salary to be used for the 
calculation of social security contributions and health, and personal income tax, ac-
cording to the nomenclature of economic activity (for employees in the non-public 
performing unskilled jobs).
Self-employed workforce in the agricultural sector is considered poorly-paid (the 
minimum legal quota). While those who claim less income than they earn, are the 
people who ignore the old-age pension and thus save some of the hidden income for 
the period of retirement. 
Literature Review
There exist two main forms of mandatory systems. The first one is known to be the 
German system. In this system, a benefit proportional to lifetime contributions 
which provides a generous relative pension for everybody but requires quite high 
mandatory contribution rate. The second one is known to be the original British 
system. In this system, a universal flat pension which alleviates old-age poverty with 
modest mandatory contribution rate but requires complementary benefits. Another 
type of pension system can be considered the means-tested system. The fixed quota 
is conditional and if the proportional benefit is lower than the minimum value, 
then the benefit is topped up to the minimum. Friedman and Cohen (1972) have 
dialed with the comparison of a universal flat pension and the means-tested and 
have suggested the reduction of the welfare program size by replacing the former by 
the latter. 
According to Feldstein (1987), the fact that the optimal choice between a means-
tested program and a universal program depends on the character of the working 
population has an important general implication for the design of social security 
programs. It implies that, if the working population can be subdivided into groups 
that differ in the relevant parameters, it may be optimal to have a means-tested 
program for some groups and a universal program for others. He found that welfare 
is higher in the optimal means-tested system compared to the universal one. In his 
model he neglected wage heterogeneity and labor supply flexibility.  As a conse-
quence the flat plus benefit reduces to a flat benefit and the means-tested benefit is 
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zero for the life-cyclers. The study of Augusztinovics (2005) has shown that there 
will be considerable differences among cohorts in the wage level and also a large 
part of the cohorts retiring in the next decades will have quite low pensions. A later 
study of Augusztinovics and Köllő (2008) demonstrated the occurrence of differ-
ences through the cohort. As a solution of poverty these studies have suggested: 1- a 
significant scaling down of the present proportional benefits and contribution rate 
and 2- introducing a universal flat benefit, to be financed from new taxes. 
Barr and Diamond (2008) following the analysis of Varian (1980) have strongly 
emphasized the insurance provided by the progressive pension system when the 
future earnings are uncertain at the start. The insurance function of the pension sys-
tem has been neglected here. They studied the Chile’s means-tested pension system 
where they founded that the lower-paid savings would increase, whereas the others 
savings would have a decrease. But the overall situation would slightly improve. In 
another study, Fehr and Habermann (2008) have founded that their optimum is a 
strong progressive system. They computed a general equilibrium model by taking 
into consideration the individual risk of career paths and life spans. They used the 
concept of a socially optimal “progressive pension arrangement” by determining the 
key parameters. The means-tested was excluded from their analysis.    
Models of pension systems
Proportional Pensions
In this study the model of Hungarian Academy of Science is used and applied for 
the Albanian case. The population number is taken unchanged, making the assump-
tion that each young is active in the labor market and each old person is in retire-
ment. R is the symbol of working years for a normal worker and S, the years spend 
in pension. Dependency ratio defined as the rapport between the pension years and 
the working years is RS=µ . The “wage” presents the total wage cost, which is 
used as total wage and denoted by w . Contribution of each individual in the pen-
sion fond is forcasted to be equal to the rate  τ of total reported wage. Fiscal effects 
have been eleminated. Another assumption in the model is that the reporting or not 
of the exact income will not be directly related the the pension system applied in the 
country. Lastly, the system is taken in equilibrium, the incomes equals the expenses. 
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The rate of informal economy is found to be the largest in Albania compared to the 
other countries in the region (approximately 50% of GDP). This is the main reason 
of categorizing the workers in three different types:
1) Poorly-paid workers (denoted L)
2) Middle or highly-paid workers categorized according to their reporting status: 
- The workers reporting all their incomes (R)
- The workers unrreporting their incomes (U).
The frequency per each type of worker is as follows: ƒR, ƒU and ƒL , being all positives 
and having a sum of 1. In some special case of developed economies where fiscal 
evasion is pretty nothing, one of these frequencies can be equal to 0. Considering 
the total work force as a unit, the worker number is stated to be equal to 1.
In the attemption to proximate the aim of the actual albanian system, ( by focusing 
on the  undertaken reforms), it is supposed that in the basic system the individuals 
receive what they report, which is denoted by *.  ∗τ  represents the contribution 
rate in this system. The actual earnings of the workers are: UR ww =  and Lw , 
while their benefits are: Rb∗  and LU bb ∗∗ = . Based on the above  assumptions, the 
benefits are proportional to the reported earnings; RR wb
∗∗ = β  and LU wb
∗∗ = β
, where ∗β  is the replacement rate in the proportional system. Some important 
details such as the case of Lw to be legally the minimum wage when the there is no 
actual and fictitious partial employment will be  simplyfied in this model. (Kertesi 
and Kollo, 2003 and Tonin, 2005).
The total reported earnings are denoted by ( LW ), and the actual ones are ( LW ), 
which are equal to:
( ) LLURRL wffwfW ++=         and            ( ) LLRURR wfwffW ++=
Since the system is supposed to be in equilibrium, then,
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Given that the replacement rates are higher, it is assumed that those who report all 
their earnings will not save money to consume in the future. However, the evaders 
will save proportionally to what they do not report in order to consume in the old-
age. Saving rate is supposed to be: ∗τσ 0 , and annual savings: ( )LR ww −σ
. The efficiency ratio is: SR σρ  which can be equal to, smaller or greater than 1.
The comparison between “Young-Age Consumption” and “Old-Age Consumption” 
is used to have the full picture of the whole life cycle consumption. 
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Young-age consumption is:
( ) RR wc ∗∗ −= τ1 ;   ( ) ( )( )LRLU wwwc −−+−= ∗∗ στ 11 ;   ( ) LL wc ∗∗ −= τ1
Old-age consumption is:
RR bd ∗∗ = ;    ( )LRLU wwbd −+= ∗∗ ρ ;   LL bd ∗∗ =
In the proportional system, the actual or reported low earning ensure a low pension 
and a low consumption in the old-age. 
Basic Pension System
In this system, the contribution rate is supposed to be given as: 0b  which is financed 
from a consumption tax rate ιˆ . Each individal will pay his/her proportional tax 
after each consumption. This kind of reform, the scaling-down of the proportional 
system and a simultaneous introduction of a basic pension, has been enspired by 
the work done of several authors (Augusztinovics, 2005; Barabas, 2006). The gross 
pensions are as follows:
ι
β
ˆ1
ˆˆ 0
−
+=
bwb RR       and    ι
β
ˆ1
ˆˆˆ 0
−
+==
bwbb LLU
Different from the pension contribution, the payment of the consumption taxes 
are assumed to be unavoidable. However, this kind of system can be difficult to be 
applied in Albania. The lack of box offices, the problem of tax evasion, indirectly 
VAT calulation method, (all included in the informal economy), are some of the 
problematic issues making the application of this system difficult.
No saving is assumed to be present  in the basic pension system. Total consumption 
is equal to total production, being equal to total incomes too. Since µ  pensioners 
correspond to 1 worker, the tax equation is as follows:
RWb ιµ ˆ0 =
The down-scaled contribution wτ  finance only the reduced labor pension 
LL WWw βµτβ ˆˆ:ˆ = , so  βµτ ˆˆ = .
The equation below emphasizes the assumption that all total expenses are un-
changed. 
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LRL WWW
∗=+ τιτ ˆˆ
By replacing ιˆ  from old equation to the new one then, 
LL WbW
∗=+ τµτ 0ˆ
The reduced contribution can be determined as follows:
LW
b0ˆ µττ −= ∗
It is supposed that LWb
∗≤ τµ 0  in order to have positive contribution so, 
µτ LWb
∗≤0 .
Young consumption is: 
( )( ) RR wc τι ˆ1ˆ1ˆ −−= ; ( )( ) ( )( )LRLU wwwc −−+−−= στι 1ˆ1ˆ1ˆ ;   
( )( ) LL wc τι ˆ1ˆ1ˆ −−=
Old consumption is:
( ) RR bd ˆˆ1ˆ ι−= ;   ( ) ( )[ ]LRLU wwbd −+−= ρι ˆˆ1ˆ ;   ( ) LL bd ˆˆ1ˆ ι−=
Benefits and consumption of workers who report lower incomes / or actually have 
low incomes, have increased significantly compared to the proportional system. The 
benefits of type R have been reduced.
Means-tested Pension System
This is the last type of the pension systems analysed in this paper. The two previ-
ous systems can have some evident problems. For example, in the basic system, the 
workers reportiong their full earnings, (R), will benefit less than those in the propor-
tional system. Those who do not fully report their earnings, (U), will benefit more 
than the part they do not report. The third system, means-tested, will try to enhance 
the problematic issues faced in the presented systems. In this case the goverment can 
distinguish the needy person (L) and the evader (U).
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Now there are three types of benefits: RR wb β= ;  UU wb β=  and LL bb ˆ=  where 
LL wb β=ˆ . In this model the benefits of needy persons are the only ones to be fi-
nanced by the taxes: ( ) RLLL Wiwbf =− βµ ˆ
Contributes wτ  are financed from the proportional component βµτβ =:w . By 
using the last equation then,
LRL WWiW
∗=+ ττ
LLLLL WwfbfWU
∗=−+ ττµτ ˆ
The contribution rate in the model of means-tested is: 
LLL
LLL
wfW
bfW
−
−
=
∗ ˆµτ
τ
It is supposed that LLL bfW ˆµτ ≥
∗  in order to have a positive contribution rate. The 
only difference between the means-rested system and proportional one is the exclu-
sion of the evaders. By excluding the evaders, the needy pension increases and the 
pension of highly-paid persons decreases, without making the distinguish between 
fully reported or not.
Albanian Case
Data specification and determination
Based on the the statistical data of average mean for the Albanian population work-
ing average years before retiring are 35=R 5. Substracting the working average years 
from average living years, which is found to be 74 years for the albanians, and sup-
posing that the average years of entering to labor market is 20 (taking into account 
both qualified and unqualified workers), it is calculated that the average time spend 
in retirement is 20 years, denoted by S . The dependency ratio, which is the rapport 
of retirement years to working years, is 57.0=µ .57. 
The calculations related to the revenus are based on employment data of average 
salaries according to sectors published by INSTAT (2007). The following assump-
tion have been done because of the lack of detailed data corresponding employment 
salaries.
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1- All the labor force founded in public institutions or in private sectors (except the 
agricultural sector) are categorised as well-paid individuals.
2- The work force founded in the agriculture sector are assumed to be poorly-paid 
individuals.
3-  The Albanian informal economy, (in year 2004 OECD “measured” that the in-
formal level in Albania to be 30%-60%), is assumed to be 50%.
4- All the individuals working at public institutions report their fully earnings.
Based on the above assumptions and data of INSTAT, employers distributions is as 
below:
3.0=Rf ; 12.0=Uf 2 and 58.0=Lf  0. 8
 The rapport of earning distribution between well-paid and poorly-paid is calculated 
to be 4.3 (It is assumed that the average salary in the privat sector is 60.000 ALL, in 
the public sector 35.650 ALL and the minimal wage in the privat sector, excluding 
agricultiral sector, is 14.000 ALL). Briefly, the earning distribution is 3.4=Rw , 
1=Lw . The average reported wage is 2=LW , which is consistend to albanian data 
published by the Institute of Statistics,  2x140000=28000 ALL.
In addition, it is assumed also that the basic benefit is equal to the half of the aver-
age proportional pension ( )µτ 20 LWb =  and the contribution evander saves half 
the money that the Social Security would save from him from his hidden earnings, 
2τσ = . 
Table 1. Main Parameters
Parameter
Population distribution according to their reporting Saving Rates, 
σƒR ƒU ƒL
Base Run 0.3 0.12 0.58 0.119
Full Reporting 0.42 0 0.58 0.119
Every low earner evander 0.3 0.7 0 0.119
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Base Run
The distribution is as follows: 
3.0=Rf ; 12.0=Uf 2 and 58.0=Lf  0. 8
Table 2 presents the parameters and the benefits of the evander in three systems 
while table 3 summarises the consumption vectors. 
Table 2. Parameters of three pension systems
Type
Contribution Rate Tax Rate The Evader’s Benefit
τ ι bU
Proportional 0.239 0 0.42
 + Basic Benefit 0.119 0.099 0.674
 + Means-tested Benefit 0.179 0.05 0.314
Contribution rate is founded to be 0.239 for the Albanian case. This is the rate paid 
by the employer to the Social Securities. The Albanian system is near to the propor-
tional system analized in this paper. 
In the basic benefit system contribution rate is approximately halved, meanwhile a 
consumption tax of about 9.9% is added up. This system increases the benefits of 
evaders by around 60% but it does not make any distinction between full reports 
(R) and underreports (U). 
A partial solution for this problem can be found by integrating a component of 
tested-means. By this, a considerable increase of contribution rate compared to basic 
benefits is found where consumption tax decreses from 9.9% to 5%. 
The impact of explained systems in the consumption vectors can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3. Characteristics of three pension systems
Type
Young-age Consumption Old-age Consumption
cR cU cL cR cU cL
Proportional 3.272 3.668 0.761 1.806 0.813 0.420
 + Basic Benefit 3.413 3.701 0.794 1.229 0.999 0.607
 + Means-tested Benefit 3.354 3.687 0.780 1.350 0.811 0.674
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The benefits of type R and L, without taking into account the taxes, are equal to 
the respective consumption in old-age. Not the same implication happens to the 
U type, which saves for consumption during the retirement. Even if the rate of U 
is not high enough, there is nothing to worry about U type individual consump-
tion, because as seen in table 3, his consumption is 1.94 times greater than L type 
individual.
If the consumption level of young-age and old-age of different systems are com-
pared, then the means-tested system is found to be superior to the basic one because 
this system supports the need’s old-age consumption (L) rather than the evander’s 
consumption.  
Table 3.a. Characteristics of three pension systems in terms of WR
Type
Young-age Consumption Old-age Consumption
cR cU cL cR cU cL
Proportional 1.363 1.528 0.317 0.753 0.339 0.175
 + Basic Benefit 1.422 1.542 0.330 0.512 0.416 0.253
 + Means-tested Benefit 1.397 1.536 0.325 0.563 0.338 0.281
No evaders
Even if the used assumption is non-realistic for the Albanian case, it is important to 
present the case when there are no evaders.
42.0=Rf . 2 and 0=Uf
The contribution rate is the same as in the proportional system, 239.0=τ . Table 
4 includes the new parameters, while table 5 presents all the results according to the 
last parameters.
Table 4. Parameters of three pension systems (no evaders)
Type
Contribution Rate Tax Rate
τ ι
Proportional 0.239 0
 + Basic Benefit 0.119 0.119
 + Means-tested Benefit 0.175 0.064
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Since the evaders disappeared, in the basic system the tax rose from  9.9% to 11.9% 
and in means-tested system from 5% to 6.5%, while the contribution rate decreases 
from  17.9% to 9%.
Table 5. Characteristics of three pension systems (no evaders)
Type
Young-age Consumption Old-age Consumption
cR cU cL cR cU cL
Proportional 3.272 - 0.761 1.806 - 0.420
 + Basic Benefit 3.337 - 0.776 1.276 - 0.683
 +Means-tested Benefit 3.320 - 0.772 1.320 - 0.775
The consumption changes are more complex. In the proportional system there is no 
change, while in the basic one the consumption of young-age increases (indepen-
dently from income level), and the consumption of old-age decreases relating their 
income levels. The underlying fact is that these variations in the consumption levels 
are very low or insignificant. The means-tested system advantage compared to the 
basic one is diminushed insignificantly. Low income elders’ consumption decreases 
in both systems. 
Every low-paid is evader
This model supposes that low-paid individual is an evader. 
3.0=Rf  and 7.0=Uf
Based on the definitions, means-tested system is reduced to a proportional system 
(since there are no individuals in need), this is the reason why we do not examine 
this case. Table 6 represents the new parameters while table 7 gives the results.
Table 6. Parameters of three pension systems (all evaders)
Type
Contribution Rate Tax Rate Evader’s Benefits
τ ι bU
Proportional 0.239 0.000 0.420
 + Basic Benefit 0.119 0.056 0.653
A Simple Model Referring Evasion Case in Albanian Pension System
155Volume 2        Number 1        Spring 2012
Here it can be observe just one change comparing to the basic system, the tax rate 
decreases from  11.9% to 5.6%. 
Table 7. Characteristics of three pension systems (all evaders)
Type
Young-age Consumption Old-age Consumption
cR cU cL cR cU cL
Proportional 3.272 3.668 - 1.806 0.813 -
 + Basic Benefit 3.576 3.738 - 1.267 1.407 -
The changes occured in the pension basic system are as follow: the consumption 
of individuals which are no-evader and are high-paid is increased compared to the 
basic system. In the same time, the problem of pension basic system are found to be 
more evident, in this case the evaders exploit the full contributors.
Conclusion
The aim of this study is to find possible answer to the question: Which of the social 
insurance systems is the best for the Albanian case? Three system types have been 
analysed by applying the actual albanian values. The findings of this study strongly 
support the means-tested system, given that this system has positive impact on the 
needy fraction of the population and shows only an increase in the pension of the 
low income people compared to basic system.
After all these detailed calculations, it can be concluded that, if all the evaders are 
excluded, and without making difference between the pension systems, the govern-
ment has to choose the means-tested system and not that of basic one. In case the 
evaders can not be excluded, the solution is  not so simple. Briefly, if the savings 
are directly connected to pension system, then the difference between consumption 
rates in both, means-tested and basic system are insignificant.
Another important issue to be mentioned is that the lower the part of proportional 
component in total pension, the higher the well-paid individuals number which 
underreport their wages.
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